Abstract
In most times and places,
women on average marry older men. We propose a partial explanation for
this difference and for
why it is diminishing. In
a society in which the economic roles of males are more varied than the
roles of females, the relative
desirability of females
as marriage partners may become evident at an earlier age than is the case
for males. We study an
equilibrium model in which
the males who regard their prospects as unusually good choose to wait until
their economic
success is revealed before
choosing a bride. In equilibrium, the most desirable young females choose
successful older males.
Young males who believe
that time will not treat them kindly will offer to marry at a young age.
Although they are aware that
young males available for
marriage are no bargain, the less desirable young females will be offered
no better option than the
lottery presented by marrying
a young male. We show the existence of equilibrium for models of this type
and explore the
properties of equilibrium.