Announcements:
·
HW#2 is due Tues., April 27.
·
HW#3 is now on the problem set link.
Microeconomics
Economics 210C
(http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~deacon/econ210c.htm)
Robert
Deacon
Spring 2010
Office hours: Tues. 9:00-11:00 or by
appointment, 3040 North Hall (deacon@econ.ucsb.edu).
Exams
and Grading: Grades will be based
on:
Midterm exam scheduled for May 4 (35%)
Final exam scheduled for Mon., June 7, 12:00-3:00pm (50%)
problem sets (15%).
Course
content: This course covers the
material in Mas-Colell, et al, Microeconomic Theory (1995)
Chapters 10-13 and possibly 14, plus a few supplementary readings. The
supplementary readings are not intended to introduce new theoretical concepts.
They are intended for in class discussion, to suggest the range of application
for concepts from the assigned material.)
Chapter 10, Competitive Markets.
Supplementary reading: Robert T. Deacon and Jon Sonstelie, “Price
Controls and Rent Dissipation with Endogenous Transaction Costs,” American
Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (December 1991) 1361-1373.
Chapter 11, Externalities and
Public Goods.
Skip: Depletable Externalities in Sec. 11D; Decentralized Bargaining
in Sec. 11E; Example 11.AA.1 in Appendix A.
Supplementary reading: J. Hirshleifer, “From
weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods”, Public Choice, 41 (1983) 371-386.
Midterm
Exam (May 4) Will try to schedule for 2 hours.
Chapter 12, Market Power
Skip: Example 12.C.2 in Sec. 12C, The Linear
City Model of Product Differentiation; Entry and Welfare in Sec.
12.E; Appendix B. In Appendix A we will only cover Nash Reversion and the Nash Reversion Folk Theorem.
Supplementary reading: d’Aspremont, Claude, et
al. “On
the stability of collusive price leadership” Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 16 (1) (1983) 17-25.
Chapter 13, Adverse Selection,
Signaling and Screening.
Skip: ‘Small type’ section on pages 448-450; Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements
in Signaling Games, Appendix A.
Supplementary reading: Kelly Bedard, 2001. “Human
Capital versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Dropouts.”
Journal of Political Economy, 190(4) (2001) 749-775.
Chapter
14, The Principal-Agent Problem.
Skip:TBA.
Supplementary reading: TBA.
Final Exam June 7, 12:00-3:00