

**University of California, Santa Barbara
Department of Economics**

**Economics 594: Graduate Personnel Economics
Reading List**

Reference Works and Overviews

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II. TRAINING

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- Neal, D. "Industry-Specific Capital : Evidence from Displaced Workers". Journal of Labor Economics 13 (October 1995): 653-677.
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- Kuhn, P. "Demographic Groups and Personnel Policy" Labour Economics 1 (June 1993): 49-70.
- Royalty, Anne B. "Job-to-Job and Job-to-Nonemployment Turnover by Gender and Education Level". Journal of Labor Economics 16 (2) (April 1998): 392-443.
- Autor, David. "Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General-Skills Training?" NBER working paper no. 7637, April 2000.

III. INCENTIVES IN FIRMS

Overviews

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IV. ISSUES IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

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V. MODELLING CAREERS

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VI. "NEW" HRM SYSTEMS

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