Applications

• 1.2.1 Trade Policies - Introduction
• 1.2.2 Tariffs
  • 1.2.2.1 Tariffs - Small Country, Partial Equilibrium: One-Good Case
  • 1.2.2.2 Tariffs - Small Country, General Equilibrium: Two-Good Case
  • 1.2.2.3 Tariffs - Small Country, Analysis using Offer Curves
  • 1.2.2.4 Tariffs - Large Country, Partial Equilibrium: One-Good Case
  • 1.2.2.5 Tariffs - Large Country, General Equilibrium: Two-Good Case
  • 1.2.2.6 Tariffs - Large Country, Analysis using Offer Curves
  • 1.2.2.7 Effective Rate of Protection
  • 1.2.2.8 Externality and Protection
  • 1.2.2.9 The Sector Approach to Protection
• 1.2.3 Quotas
• 1.2.4 VER: Voluntary Export Restrictions
• 1.2.5 Export Subsidy - Large Country
• 1.2.6 Domestic Monopolist and Trade - Import
• 1.2.7 Domestic Monopolist and Trade - Export
• 1.2.8 Dumping (Persistent)
• 1.2.9 Application of Game Theory to International Trade
  • 1.2.9.1 Games with Dominant Strategy Equilibrium - Cartel
  • 1.2.9.2 Games with Dominant Strategy Equilibrium - Prisoners' Dilemma
  • 1.2.9.3 Games with Dominant Strategy Equilibrium - Free Trade and Protection
  • 1.2.9.4 Games with Nash Equilibrium 1
  • 1.2.9.5 Games with Nash Equilibrium 2
  • 1.2.9.6 Trade Policies using Game Theory - Strategic Trade Theory 1
  • 1.2.9.7 Trade Policies using Game Theory - Sequential Game and Backward Induction
  • 1.2.9.8 Trade Policies using Game Theory - Strategic Trade Theory 2
• 1.2.10 Economic Integration - Benefits and Costs
• 1.2.11 Types of Economic Integration
• 1.2.12 Current Economic Blocs

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[mtcha@ecel.uwa.edu.au]

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