Dissertation Defense: “Essays in Labor Economics”, Sebastian Brown
Speaker
Sebastian Brown, PhD Candidate, University of California, Santa Barbara
Title
“Essays in Labor Economics”
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays investigating questions in applied labor economics. The first essay applies a
recently developed statistical test to study a general behavioral labor question, while the latter two essays apply
synthetic control methods to examine the impacts of specific contemporary labor legislation.
The first essay, which is joint work with Kenneth Chan, studies how people update their wage expectations over time
using a nationally representative survey conducted in four-month intervals. Using an excess belief movement test
(Augenblick and Rabin 2021), we find strong evidence of non-Bayesian learning at the aggregate level. We estimate
that the average belief movement is 518% of the average uncertainty reduction in survey respondents' beliefs, 418%
more than the Bayesian benchmark. Our simulations show that this result is unlikely to be explained solely by
measurement error. We also find evidence of asymmetric updating, where individuals update their beliefs more when
they receive higher wage offers than expected.
The second essay, which is joint work with Thomas Fullagar, studies the effectiveness of pay transparency in job ads in
reducing gender pay disparities. We address this question by examining the impact of Colorado's Equal Pay for Equal
Work Act, a pioneering statewide policy mandating that employers disclose salary ranges in all job postings. Employing
a synthetic control method to compare Colorado's experience with a carefully constructed counterfactual, we find no
evidence that the law narrowed the gender earnings gap among newly hired workers. In fact, our estimates indicate a
widening of approximately 15 percent, a statistically significant increase relative to the synthetic control. We perform
additional correlational industry-level analysis, finding suggestive patterns consistent with gender differences in search
or bargaining behavior. Our results highlight critical challenges in designing transparency policies and emphasize the
necessity of ensuring that information interventions align closely with the behavioral responses of the intended
beneficiaries.
The third essay concludes by studying whether minimum pay rate rules are effective in improving worker welfare in gig
work markets. It similarly examines the overall effect such policy has independent contractor labor supply. To
investigate these questions, I explore the effects of a recently enacted statewide legislation in Washington mandating
minimum transportation network company driver pay rates and paid sick leave on counties that did not previously
have similar legislation. Using administrative tax data, I study the effects on self-employed workers in the taxi and
limousine services industry (which includes both taxi and transportation network company drivers). Relative to my
constructed synthetic controls, I estimate that the law increased average earnings by about $1,191 and decreased the
number of workers by about 8 per 100,000 residents during the first year it was effective. However, these differences
do not remain statistically significant under placebo testing. Additional descriptive analysis using household survey
data suggests that the new legislation might have allowed those driving as a primary occupation to earn higher
effective hourly wages, leading to similar yearly earnings with fewer hours of work.
Event Details
Join us for Sebastian’s dissertation defense, presenting his dissertation titled, ““Essays in Labor Economics.” To access a copy of the dissertation, you must have an active UCSB NetID and password.
