Dissertation Defense: “Essays in Experimental Finance and Economics”, Caroline J. Zhang
Speaker
Caroline J. Zhang, PhD Candidate, University of California, Santa Barbara
Title
"Essays in Experimental Finance and Economics"
Abstract
This thesis examines individual decision-making under uncertainty through three experimental studies in the domains
of financial risk-taking, academic effort, and lying behavior. The central chapter examines how observing performance
feedback throughout the investment process influences risk-taking behavior following gains and losses by conducting
an online experiment. I find that while participants initially plan to take more risk after gains than losses, observing
performance feedback systematically leads them to deviate from these intentions—revealing the well-documented
disposition effect. When feedback is withheld, this pattern reverses: participants are more likely to hold onto gains andcut losses, aligning with a more optimal investment strategy. Most participants are unaware of these feedback-driven
deviations. I also find that the effect of recent outcomes changes over time: early in the investment process, gains
reduce risk-taking, while later in the process, they encourage continued investment.
The second chapter, joint work with Anna Jaskiewicz, Ruth Morales, and Dingyue (Kite) Liu, presents a field experiment
conducted among undergraduate students at UCSB. We study how real-time performance feedback—delivered
through a gamified leaderboard—affects students’ academic effort and engagement. The leaderboard, integrated into
weekly online assignments and auto-graded by an AI-assisted platform, ranks students based on both score and
submission time. We find that students exposed to this real-time feedback complete their assignments significantly
earlier than those in the control group. This points to the positive influence of gamified leaderboards on reducing
procrastination tendencies and motivating students to complete tasks earlier.
The third chapter, joint work with Jaimie Lien and Jie Zheng, presents a laboratory experiment investigating how social
preferences relate to lying behavior. We assess individuals’ preferences over social allocations along with their lying
tendencies in the analogous scenarios, using a novel multinomial version of a ‘mind cheating game’, which allows
different degrees of lying and is independent of social image and reputation concerns. We find that selfish and spiteful
lies are prevalent among those with strong spiteful preferences in the allocation task, while those subjects with
efficiency-oriented preferences tend to tell efficient lies on behalf of others. However, among those with a strong
preference for fairness in allocations with own-payoff consequence, lying on behalf of fairness concerns is less
apparent. Altogether, the empirical patterns suggest that individuals with a strong preference for efficiency in such
scenarios are more likely to lie for fairness concerns, while those with a strong fairness preference may be more likely
to lie out of self-interest.
Event Details
Join us for Caroline’s dissertation defense, presenting her dissertation titled, “Essays in Experimental Finance
and Economics.” To access a copy of the dissertation, you must have an active UCSB NetID and password.
