On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings

 The American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 1. (Mar., 1995), pp. 58-81.
Abstract
This paper explores the evolutionary foundations of altruism among siblings and extends the
biologists' kin-selection theory to a richer class of games between relatives. It shows that a
population will resist invasion by dominant mutant genes if individuals maximize a
"semi-Kantian" utility function in games with their siblings. It is shown that a population that
resists invasion by dominant mutants may be invaded by recessive mutants. Conditions are
found under which a population resists invasion by dominant and also by recessive mutants.
(JEL C70, D10, D63)

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